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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
J. EARL MORRIS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
C. LEO CHRISTENSEN and DALE
CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants.

Case No.

9217

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case concerns an intersection collision involving
plaintiff's automobile, going east on 9000 South, Salt Lake
County, and an automobile driven by defendant C. Leo Christensen, and owned by his son, counterclaimant Dale Chris.tensen. With Dale Christensen asleep in the car C. Leo
Christensen had been driving north on State Street. At
the intersection 9000 South had two lanes and was 41 paved
feet wide, and State Street had four lanes and was 70 paved
feet wide.
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Plaintiff sued for damages against the defendant and
counterclaimant, both of whom counterclaimed. At the pretrial conference the negligence of defendant C. Leo Christensen was conceded. Plaintiff's complaint against the
defendant Dale Christensen was dismissed, leaving him in
the case as a counterclaimant (R. 83-85).
The case was tried before Merrill C. Faux, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Without a jury. Judge Faux rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant, and dismissed the counterclaims. Defendant and counterclaimant appeal from that
judgment.
Plaintiff testified that at about 6 :30 a. m., December
26, 1958, he was driving east on 90th South Street, approaching State Street, in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 13).
He was alone in his car, a 1955 Mercury (R. 14. Ex. 1-P).
The weather was clear. The road was dry. Daylight was
breaking, but plaintiff's headlights were still necessary and
were on (R. 14). The intersection had bright street lighting (R. 14). As he arrived at State Street, the traffic semaphore was red against him. He stopped his car and waited
about 30 seconds for the light to change color (R. 24). When
the semaphore turned green for him, he waited for a car
on State Street to stop. This car was in the west, inside,
lane of northbound traffic (R. 15). While plaintiff had
been stopped his visibility in all directions was unobstructed,
except for the signs of a corner gas station on his right,
south. This minor obstruction did not prevent him from
being able to see to the south "a considerable distance" (R.
28).
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As plaintiff crossed the west side of State Street there
was no hazard nor approaching traffic from the north, his
left (R. 28, 29). His headlights illuminated 9000 South to
the east) ahead of him, for several hundred feet and there
were no hazard nor approaching traffic coming from that
direction (R. 28, 29). There was no traffic behind him (R.
29) . In regard to his looking south there is some variance
in his testimony, although he admitted that as he crossed
the center of State Street, south was the only direction from
which traffic might come (R. 31). In substance plaintiff
looked to the south once as he crossed the intersection ( R.
29-31), and this was "as I was nearing the center of the
intersection I looked to the south * * *" (R. 31). The
stopped car in the west lane of northbound traffic did not
substantially impair plaintiff's view of State Street to the
south (R. 29). After crossing the center of State Street
and clearing the stopped northbound car, plaintiff was not
sure if he looked south again (R. 29).
Plaintiff failed to see the car driven by defendant.
Plaintiff testified "Well, I proceeded across and I was
nearly through the intersection and just the instant before
impact why I saw this car hit me. It was too late for me
to do anything about it" (R. 15). Plaintiff had no explanation for not seeing the car driven by defendant (R. 31).
He affirmed his answer given on deposition that he first
saw the car driven by defendant "just at the time the crash
occurred" ( R. 28) .
Plaintiff knew that the speed limit on State Street was
40 miles per hour (R. 24).
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Plaintiff had some variance in locating the place of
impact. He testified that at impact his car was ( 1) 14 or
15 feet from the east ed:ge of State Street (R. 16), (2)
"nearly through the intersection" (R. 15), (3) "Well, I
would say that it is about in the center of the east lane of
the northbound traffic" ( R. 25) , and ( 4) affirmed his
answer given on deposition "Well, it wa~it was on the east
side of State Street; the east traffic and it was nearly off
the street. When he hit me he turned-he turned the way
that I was going, east, somewhat to try and miss me, I suppose, and that is where the accident occurred, nearly off of
State Street" (R. 25, 26).
Prior to impact plaintiff did not change course or speed
and did nothing to avoid the collision (R. 25, 60). His speed
at impact was 12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 51).
Impact of the collision was received on the right front
of plaintiff's car between the front wheel and front door
(R. 26, 51).
Plaintiff's witness, Joel Lund, was the driver of the
car that had stopped for the semaphore in the west lane of
northbound traffic ( R. 32) . Mr. Lund testified that plaintiff had the green light ( R. 33, 35) . He located the place
of impact as "Well, it was a little bit off to the east of the
outside lane" ( R. 34, 36) , that is that the impact occurred
off of, and east of, the traffic lanes of State Street. He testified that, at impact, the car driven by defendant was headed
north (R. 35), or northeast (R. 36). Mr. Lund did not see
defendant's car until the impact (R. 34).
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Deputy Sheriff H. J. Houmand, the investigating officer, testified as follows for plaintiff. He diagrammed the
intersection and stated that 9000 South had two traffic
lanes, was paved for 41 feet and had 7 feet of shoulders,
for a total width of 48 feet ( R. 42, 43) . State Street had
four paved traffic lanes, with two of them for northbound
traffic and two of them for southbound traffic ( R. 40).
The lanes were separated in the center by double, yellow,
painted lines (R. 40). State Street was bounded by curbs
and a retaining wall and had no substantial shoulders (R.
42, 43). It had a paved width of 70 feet (R. 42).
Officer Houmand placed the point of impact at 14 feet
from the center of the intersection (R. 39). Plaintiff's car
was damaged on the rear of the right front fender and doorpost (R. 51) and the car driven by defendant was. damaged
on the left front (R. 50). He did not determine the speed
of the car driven by defendant from its skidmarks (R. 42),
but stated that the debris from the collision was. concentrated in a two or three foot area (R. 47). He affirmed
that on his officer's report he had: indicated the speed limit
on State Street was 40 miles per hour ( R. 43, 44) . He stated
that the car driven by defendant left 38 feet of skidmarks
prior to the point of impact (R. 39, 46), that these skidmarks angled off to the east in a straight line (R. 46, 47),
and that both cars came to rest east of the point of impact
with the plaintiff's. car 8 feet east of the car driven by
defendant and that car being 14 feet from the point of impact (R. 39, 40, 45, 46). When asked why the two cars
came to rest in this position he stated "I would assume that
the Christensen-that the Christensen car was trying to
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miss the ~orris car." He was then asked "Q. You mean
it was turneq toward the east at the impact?" and he replied "A. That's right" (R. 46).
At the close of plaintiff's case a motion was made to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint "on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence shows plaintiff to be guilty of contributory
negligence which was the subs~antial, proximate cause of
the accident" (R. 53). The motion was denied.
Defendant C. Leo Christensen testified that he was the
father of the ·counterclaimant herein (R. 54, 55), and that
he was driving and the counterclaimant sleeping in the car
at the time the accident occurred (R. 55). Defendant had
been driving automobiles for 33 years and had had no prior
automobile accidents of any kind (R. 56, 57).
Defendant testified that he had been driving straight
through from Payson, Utah, that he had not been drinking
(R. 56), and that counterclaimant's. car was in good mechanical condition (R. 57). Approaching the subject intersection he was driving at about 40 miles per hour, and had
been in the outside, east, lane of traffic for 6 or 7 miles (R.
57).
He failed to see the semaphore until he was about 100
feet from the intersection. At that time the semaphore was
yellow. He did not look at it again (R. 57). He first saw
plaintiff's car at the· same time that he first saw the semaphore. Plaintiff was then just coming to the west edge of
the State Street pavement and was moving slowly-at 2, 3
or 4 miles per hour (R. 64). At that point defendant took
his foot off the accellerator (R. 67, 68). He thought that
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he had the right of way because he was so close to the intersection that he couldn't stop and the light was yellow (R.
57, 70). He was vague on when he first apprehended danger from plaintiff (R. 67-70).
Defendant next saw plaintiff when plaintiff was in
the middle of the intersection. At this point defendant was,
by defendant's testimony, 20 feet south of the intersection's
south edge (R. 64), and about 35 feet from plaintiff (R.
65) . He estimated that he had lost 5 miles per hour in speed
since letting up on the accellerator (R. 68). He then, for
the first time, applied his brakes. (R. 65).
When defendant braked, he turned right, east, to avoid
plaintiff ( R. 59), but couldn't turn sharply because of a
ditch bordering the east edge of State Street (R. 59). He
was headed northeast at impact (R. 60). At impact he estimated that he and plaintiff were both going at about the
same speed-12 to 15 miles per hour (R. 60).
Defendant claimed that the point of impact was 14 feet
east of the paved portion of State Street (R. 60, 65). Impact
occurred on the left front fender of the car he was driving
(R. 60). He assisted Officer Houmand in making measurements of the scene after the accident (R. 61, 65), and stated
that Officer Houmand was in error in his statement that
the impact occurred 14 feet from the center of the intersection. He pointed out that this measurement would place the
impact in the inside, west, lane of northbound traffic, and
that he and Officer Houmand had actually taken the 14 foot
measurement from the east edge of State Street, not from
the center of State Street (R. 61, 65). It would. appear
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that Officer's Houmand's location of the point of impact
is contrary to all of the rest of the testimony, and further
that it would place the impact in the west lane of northbound traffic, which would be very difficult as that lane
was occupied by the Lund car (R. 32). This location of the
place of impact is also inconsistent with the officer's own
statement that defendant's "skidmarks angled to the east
going off of the road" (R. 47).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE,
WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE, CONTRIBUTING, CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE. TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE,
WHICH WAS A PROXIMATE, CONTRIBUTING, CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
The issue is whether the plaintiff, as a matter of law,
was guilty of negligence which was a proximate and contributing cause of the accident, even though plaintiff had
the right of way, under the following facts: ( 1) Plaintiff
had been on a minor road and had been stopped for 30 seconds waiting for the traffic semaphore to change so that
he could cross an arterial highway (R. 24), (2) plaintiff
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had accellerated from. the stop and had gone across, or
almost across, the 70 foot wide arterial highway before
impact (R. 15, 16, 25, 26, 34-36, 60, 65, 78, 79, 80), (3) there
had been no traffic approaching which might have diverted
plaintiff's attention as plaintiff crossed the intersection
(R. 28, 29), and, at the place of impact, defendant was approaching from the only direction from which plaintiff
should have known, and did know, that cross traffic or
hazards might approach (R. 31), ( 4) plaintiff had had
virtually unobstructed visibility in all directions at all times
since first stopping at the intersection (R. 28, 29), ( 5) defendant had been approaching plaintiff on the arterial
highway within the speed limit and plaintiff knew the speed
limit (R. 24, 43, 44, 66), ( 6) plaintiff failed to see d~
fendant before impact (R. 15, 28, 31), and (7) defendant
had approached at 40 miles per hour (R. 57), had not
braked nor changed course until 38 feet from the place of
impact (R. 39), and was clearly not yielding right of way
to plaintiff at a time when plaintiff was still in position to
easily avoid the collision (R. 58, 59, 63-65, 69, 70).
Negligence may be determined as matter of law under
a given state of facts., even though all inferences are in
favor of submitting the issue to the jury or of upholding
a fact finding of no negligence.

Johnson v. Syme, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 P. 2d
468,
Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 1944, 106 Utah
278, 282, 147 p. 2d 875, 878.
The facts given above in the statement of the issue
fairly represent the evidence in the light most favorable
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to plaintiff, and the law as applied to these facts indicates
that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The most recent Utah case with a very close factual
similarity is Johnson v. Syme, supra. Its principles have
been affirmed in Fox v. Taylor, 1960, Utah, 352 P. 2d 154.
In Sy·me a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah, plaintiff being found
negligent as a matter of law. The similarities of Syme and
the instant case are: Both occurred on South State StreetSyme at 13800 South, and the instant case at 9000 South; in
both cases the defendant ran traffic stop signals and clearly
failed to yield right of way or take evasive action, and in
each case this was, or should have been, apparent to the
plaintiffs at a time when the plaintiffs could have avoided
the collisions. Where the two cases differ the instant case
is less favorable to plaintiff, in that in Syme the plaintiff saw the defendant before impact; in Syme the
plaintiff's speed was 50 miles per hour and in the instant
case plaintiff's speed rose from a stop to 12 to 15 miles per
hour (R. 51), giving plaintiff herein more time in which to
look for oncoming traffic and greater ability to stop quickly;
and in Syme, plaintiff was on an arterial highway in the
country and defendant entered from a side road, so that
plaintiff therein was exposed to a lesser probability of cross
traffic.
A driver with right of way may proceed until it is clear
that if he does so there· is danger of a collision. Accordingly
cases such as Bates v. Burns, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.
2d 209, allow a driver with right of way to proceed without
fault into a position of peril, even though his lookout might
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have been inadequate, if that driver could reasonably have
assumed that the other driver would yield. to him.
The instant case is distinguished from Bates v. Burns,
and other Utah case with similar conclusions, because of
factual differences, and is in accord with their legal principles. In Bates the plaintiff perceived danger when the other
vehicle was 150 feet away. Plaintiff tried thereafter to
avoid the danger, but couldn't do so because he was in an
old truck with a low rate of accelleration. Prior to that
time even if plaintiff had noticed defendant, plaintiff could
have assumed that defendant would yield, as defendant had
room in which to yield and had not manifested negligence
nor failure to yield.
In the instant cas.e plaintiff made no effort to avoid
peril because he never saw defendant (R. 15, 28, 29).
In Bates, plaintiff had a Hobson's choice. He couldn't
tell which direction defendant might choose when defendant
tried to avoid him. In the instant case defendant could not
swerve to his right, east, because of the curb and ditch (R.
43, 59), nor left, west, because of the Lund car which was
stopped in the west, inside lane of northbound traffic ( R.
15, 32). 'Vhen defendant braked he chose the only course
open to him-going ahead and to his right (R. 46, 47, 59,
60). This left plaintiff with a clear choice as to his remedial
action.
It is recognized that the disfavored driver has a greater
obligation than the favored driver to choose the right direction in which to swerve, Bates v. Burns, supra, but in the
instant case defendant had no choice. It might be argued
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that he could have continued straight ahead, but this requires an unnatural reaction from him in a split second,
and presumes that plaintiff's course of travel, which could
have been so readily altered, would not change. Plaintiff's
speed was low, he could still have stopped, and defendant
was not obliged to consider plaintiff negligent.
It should he noted that the impact occurred on the right
front of plaintiff's car and the left front of defendant's car
(R. 26, 50, 51). Considering this. and the fact that defendant's swerve to the right delayed the impact, it is clear that
a collision would have occurred if defendant had continued
on in a straight line.
Reviewing the vital factors of time and distance, plaintiff entered the intersection when defendant was 100 feet
away (R. 57, 58). At this time defendant was too close to
stop. Because of this and his belief that the light was yellow,
he assumed that he had the right of way, and that plaintiff
would yield. He eased up on the gas, his habit when crossing an intersection, but did not brake (R. 64, 67, 69, 70).
Plaintiff had determined that there was no traffic approaching from any other direction (R. 28, 29) and that any
hazard would come from the south (R. 31). His duty was
to give greatest attention to the greatest source of hazard.
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P. 2d 788.
Merely because he had the right of way given by the semaphore, plaintiff was. not excused from the duty of every
driver to keep a proper lookout and· in that lookout to see
what was to be seen. Fox v. Taylor, supra, Johnson v. Syme,
supra, Bates v. Burns, supra, Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah
390, 216 P. 2d 640, Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P.
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2d 437, Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., supra, in
which the basic, lifesaving rule of the road is well stated as
"The supreme rule of the road as to motorists at street intersections in cities is the rule of mutual forbearance."
Plaintiff failed in this duty, either not looking or not seeing. If he had seen he would have been alerted to the imminent arrival in the intersection of the defendant.
Both cars continued in straight lines until defendant
was 20 feet from the intersection and 35 feet from plaintiff
who was then under the traffic light (R. 59, 60, 64, 65).
During this interval plaintiff could have effectively stopped
or slowed at any time while crossing the 35 foot wide west
side of State Street, or the 171/2 foot wide west lane of
northbound traffic which was shielded by the Lund car
(R. 15, 32).
Defendant then braked and swerved right, east, leaving
38 feet of skidmarks running northeast (R. 39, 46, 59, 60).
Plaintiff continued blindly on.
If the trial judge's comment that defendant "chased"
plaintiff 14 feet east of the intersection (R. 79), be interpreted as a finding of fact, then plaintiff had the whole
width of State Street in which to see and avoid defendant.
As pointed out above, defendant could not reasonably have
been expected to not swerve. In addition defendant was
angled away from plaintiff at impact (R. 46, 47, 59, 60).
Accordingly, if plaintiff had followed the natural, and under
the circumstances logical, reaction of braking and swerving
away from danger, there would have been no collision. This
conclusion follows with equal force regardless of which
point of impact is chosen from the testimony.
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Right of way terminates when it is clear that the other
driver will not observe it, or poses an immediate hazard·.
Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P. 2d 59, Bates v.
Burns, supra. The duty of forbearance and avoidance then
becomes paramount. Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,
supra. The failure to yield can be manifested most directly
by the disfavored driver being so close to the favored driver,
and going so fast, that the disfavored driver cannot yield.
Under the above stated facts it appears that the plaintiff had a clear opportunity to see defendant and recognize
the hazard, and negligently failed to do so, and that plaintiff had clear opportunities which he failed to take due to
his negligence, and that plaintiff therefore proximately
contributed, without excuse, to the accident.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" has not been raised
as an issue, but deserves mention. It is not applicable
against the defendant, even if it be assumed that the defendant apprehended danger 100 feet from the intersection
and plaintiff was just entering, because at that point ( 1)
defendant was too close to the intersection to sto·p (R. 70),
and so had no clear chance, and (2) plaintiff was not then
in a position of peril. Fox v. Taylor, supra, McMurdie v.
Underwood, 1959, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P. 2d 711.
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CONCLUSIO·N

Appellants submit that the trial judge erred in not
finding the plaintiff guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the subject accident, and request that relief
be granted by remanding the case for a new trial with appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
K. SAMUEL KING,

Attorney for C. Leo Christensen, Defendant and Appellant, and for Dale Christensen, Counterclaimant and
Appellant.
405 Executive Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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